PUCL Report on Manipur Violence: A One-Sided Indictment, Not Fact-Finding

The recently published People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) report on the Manipur violence stands as a glaring example of selective narration for a political goal masquerading as fact-finding. By concluding that the violence was “not spontaneous but orchestrated, enabled by armed Meitei vigilante groups like Arambai Tenggol and Meitei Leepun, and facilitated by state complicity and law enforcement failure,” while ignoring dozens of testimonies that it began in Churachandpur with Kukis attacking Meiteis, the report not only disregards verified incidents of Kuki militant aggression preceding May 3, 2023, but also whitewashes their central role in triggering the violence. Equally misleading is the claim that the Kuki-Zo community was singularly displaced, ignoring the fact that Meiteis were the first victims of targeted attacks and were forced to flee en masse from Kuki-dominated areas. Far from being impartial, the report reads less like a balanced inquiry and more like a politically motivated indictment designed to vilify one community while absolving another.

The timeline of escalation from the vandalism of April 27, 2023, to the armed assaults and arson on May 3, 2023, clearly shows that the violence was premeditated, instigated, and executed by armed Kuki militants, not Meitei groups as PUCL alleges. The independent tribunal set up in 2024 chaired by former Supreme Court judge Kurian Joseph, and comprising ex-judges, retired IAS and IPS officers, advocates, academics and journalists, had already examined the chain of events. Yet, what was meant to deliver justice fell flat when PUCL released its report on August 20, 2025.

The PUCL, one of India’s oldest human rights organizations founded in 1976 by Jayaprakash Narayan, has a long history of challenging draconian laws like AFSPA, TADA, and POTA. But its latest intervention in Manipur has sparked sharp criticism for being one-sided and misrepresentative of the ground situation.

Mischaracterisation of Meitei Groups

The PUCL report wrongly paints Arambai Tenggol (AT) as an armed vigilante group. In reality, AT is a socio-cultural and religious organisation of Manipur, formed in 2020. It did not take up arms until after May 3, 2023.

The first major looting of weapons in the valley occurred on May 4, 2023, when a mob stormed the Manipur Police Training Centre at Pangei, Imphal East. The looting in the valley was largely a defensive reaction by the Meitei community to Kuki aggression. This pattern soon spread to other police battalions and stations throughout May. While most such incidents occurred in the valley, similar cases were also reported in Kuki-dominated hill districts such as Churachandpur. Crucially, weapons in these Kuki-Zomi dominated areas were more numerous, sophisticated, and illegal. Videos circulated online on May 3 showed Kuki militants brandishing AK-47s. These visuals directly contradicted PUCL’s claim that the May 3 protest was peaceful.

When Governor Ajay Kumar Bhalla ordered the surrender of looted and illegal arms in February 2025, AT complied. By contrast, several Kuki groups openly refused. The Kuki-Zo Eastern Village Volunteers even issued a press statement declaring they would not surrender weapons until separate administration was achieved. Evidence shows more weapons were surrendered in the valley than in the hills.

Why the Violence of May 3 Cannot Be Seen in Isolation

The violence of May 3, 2023, cannot be seen in isolation. It was the culmination of accumulated grievances, particularly within the Kuki community, triggered by state policies such as the War on Drugs. The government’s destruction of poppy plantations in the hills directly hurt Kuki interests. Eviction drives and joint surveys to reclaim Reserved and Protected Forests were met with widespread illegal encroachment, much of it linked to Kuki settlements, and were opposed by the Kuki community. Reports about possible NRC implementation further heightened anxieties among Kuki-Chin-Zomi immigrants from Myanmar, who perceived it as targeted against them. Meanwhile, the movement for Meitei/Meetei inclusion in the Scheduled Tribe list was perceived by Kukis as a threat to tribal land and opportunities. Another flashpoint was the recommendation for the deletion of “Any Kuki Tribes” (AKT) from the Scheduled Tribes list, in February 2023, citing misuse by illegal immigrants fabricating tribal identities. In June 2025, both the Meitei Alliance and the Thadou Inpi Manipur petitioned the Union Tribal Affairs Minister, pointing out that AKT gave “unlimited scope of abuse” and undermined the integrity of the ST list. Further, on March 10, 2023, the state government withdrew from the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement with the Kuki National Army (KNA) and the Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA), citing repeated violations such as extortion and illegal encroachment. All these measures deeply angered the Kuki community.

Yet PUCL failed to ask the crucial question: while the rally in Naga areas against the same ST issue ended peacefully, why did violence erupt in Kuki-dominated areas alone?

Timeline of Escalation Before May 3

On April 27, 2023 in Churachandpur, local youths vandalised an open gym scheduled to be inaugurated by the former CM N. Biren Singh. On April 28, The Indigenous Tribal Leaders Forum (ITLF) called a shutdown, and later that day, the Churachandpur Range Forest Office was set ablaze by mobs shouting “No more Reserved Forest.” On April 29, there was an unfortunate incident where Kuki miscreants dehoisted the Salai Taret flag at the residence of Mr. Oken.

On March 27, Manipur High Court Acting Chief Justice MV Muralidaran ordered the state government to submit recommendations to the central government to "consider inclusion of the Meetei/Meitei community in the Scheduled Tribe List." To oppose the High Court Order, the All Tribal Students’ Union (ATSUM) announced that it would hold a Tribal Solidarity March on May 3, 2023, in Senapati, Kangpokpi, Ukhrul, Churachandpur, Chandel, Tengnoupal, and Tamenglong, all tribal-dominated districts. Counter blockades were organised in the valley in response to ATSUM's rally. The protest ended peacefully except in Kuki-dominated areas, especially Churachandpur, which turned violent.

Timeline of May 3, 2023

10:40 a.m. (Bungmaul, Churachandpur): Bungmual Forest Office vandalized and official records burnt by protestors.

11:50 a.m. (Churachandpur): A Meitei driver assaulted by a Kuki mob.

12:45 p.m. (Churachandpur): Forest offices at Maultam and Mata Maultam in Churachandpur set ablaze.

1:30 p.m. (Sadar Hills, Kangpokpi): Kuki protestors burned CM’s posters and gates of the Thadou Cultural Festival.

1:30 p.m. (Leishang, Churachandpur): Tyres burnt by Kuki miscreants near the Anglo-Kuki War Centenary Gate.

1:50 p.m. (Saikot, Churachandpur): Saikot Forest Office vandalized and burnt by Kukis.

Around 3:30 p.m.: Photos and videos circulated showing Kuki militants wielding AK-47s at S. Bualjang and Torbung.

3:50 p.m. (Bishnupur): Kukis attacked Meitei houses at Torbung; police attempted to disperse them with tear gas.

4:10 p.m. (Bishnupur): Armed Kukis clashed with Meiteis and torched houses, forcing Meitei residents to flee under gunfire at Kangvai and Torbung.

5:40 p.m.: Around 60 houses burned in Torbung by Kuki miscreants.

5:50 p.m.: More videos of Kuki militants wielding AK-47s went viral between Churachandpur and Bishnupur border.

7:10 p.m. (Tingkangphai Sabal Leikai, Churachandpur): Ebudhou Pakhngba Temple destroyed by Kuki miscreants at the residence of Kayenpaibam Romen Meitei.

7:30 p.m. (Moreh, Tengnoupal): Most Meitei houses were torched within hours.

8:10 p.m. (New Checkon, Imphal): Meitei retaliation began with attacks on Kuki residences.

Seventeen Forest offices were burnt in April and May alone by Kuki miscreants. So far more than 250 people lost their lives, and 60,000 were displaced from both the communities 

Displacement Narratives and the State’s Abdication of Duty

In Chapter 4, Events of the Violence, PUCL stated: “The Violence led to the forced displacement of 60,000 people. The Kuki-Zo communities were driven out of the valley. Meitei communities left tribal hill-dominated areas.” This claim is blatantly false. The Kuki communities started burning Meitei houses much earlier. The Meiteis ran for their lives and were forced to flee the Kuki-dominated areas. What happened in the valley, like the burning of Kuki houses and churches, was retaliation by the Meitei community.

The first rape victim of the Manipur Violence was a 37-year-old Meitei woman from Churachandpur at around 6:30 p.m. on May 3. The naked parade of two Kuki women at Thoubal happened on May 4, which was condemned even by the Meitei community and prominent personalities across India. In response to the assault, Meitei women set ablaze the house of an accused as an act of condemnation. 

From May 4 onwards, the violence revealed not just inter-community clashes but also a systematic failure of state authorities, whose primary responsibility was to protect all civilians, irrespective of community or geography. For instance, in the valley, Kuki civilians were promptly given official shelter at the 1st and 2nd Manipur Rifles battalions. On the other hand, in Churachandpur, displaced Meitei civilians were temporarily lodged at the DC office and later shifted elsewhere. In both cases, once civilians were moved out, their villages were left unprotected and systematically destroyed.

The gravest failure, therefore, lies not in the people’s supposed “chasing out” of each other, but in the state’s inability to perform its primary duty: protecting citizens and preserving their homes. By choosing evacuation over protection, the authorities facilitated destruction on a massive scale and deepened mistrust between communities.

Political Cover for Militant Ambitions

Kuki mobs carried out coordinated attacks on May 3, targeting and burning multiple Forest Offices across Churachandpur district clear evidence that the violence was premeditated, not spontaneous. On the same day, Kuki militants looted arms, including weapons from a gun shop in Churachandpur owned by Naorem Ibomcha, an incident confirmed by an FIR. This was not an isolated development. On April 9, 2023, cadres of the Kuki Independent Army (KIA) looted arms from a designated Suspension of Operation (SoO) camp in Henglep sub-division, Churachandpur. Days earlier, the Manipur government had declared the self-styled “Commander-in-Chief” of KIA, Thangkhongam Haokip, as wanted for kidnappings, extortions, and bombings, announcing a reward of ₹50,000.

Kuki MLAs and civil society organizations openly extended support to SoO militant groups. On May 16, 2025, a joint meeting in Guwahati involving Kuki-Zomi MLAs, leaders of the Kuki-Zo Council (KZC), Zomi Council (ZC), and SoO groups resolved to suspend all engagement with the Government of India until “substantive political dialogue” was resumed. On May 12, 2023, ten MLAs from the Kuki-Zomi tribes, including two BJP ministers, publicly demanded a separate administration, claiming that the Manipur government had “miserably failed” to protect the Chin-Kuki-Zomi tribal population.

The political-militant nexus is further underscored by the Kuki National Organisation (KNO). Its president, P.S. Haokip, openly declared support for BJP candidates ahead of the 12th Manipur Assembly elections. He recalled Union Home Minister Amit Shah’s public address at Churachandpur on February 23, 2022, where Shah assured a swift settlement of Kuki political aspirations. Based on this assurance, KNO resolved to back BJP candidates across constituencies.

A Storyline that Strengthens Separatist Claims

The PUCL report’s depiction of Manipur’s present crisis in Chapter 4 (Executive Summary) as a “de facto ethnic partition” is both misleading and dangerous. By portraying the valley districts as Meitei strongholds patrolled by armed youth groups, and the hill districts as Kuki-Zo strongholds inaccessible to “Meitei police” or politicians, the report risks legitimising the separatist agenda of the Kuki community. It is troubling that PUCL adopts the terminology of “Meitei Police,” reducing the Manipur Police to an ethnic label, echoing the language often used in Kuki narratives, rather than recognising them as a state institution.

Moreover, the report’s description of the hills as “Kuki-Zo enclaves” grossly underplays the reality. Large swathes of these areas are not mere enclaves but are under the effective control of heavily armed Kuki militants who have long stockpiled sophisticated weapons. By contrast, the valley was never under such militant domination before May 3. The emergence of local Meitei defense groups was a response to escalating attacks, not a pre-existing condition.

The violence itself was triggered on May 3, when armed Kuki groups launched coordinated assaults on Meitei villages in the foothills and Meitei localities in Kuki-dominated areas. This sequence of events shows that the initial escalation stemmed from organized militant action, rather than a spontaneous outbreak of communal clashes as implied by the PUCL report.

The PUCL’s portrayal of the Manipur violence is deeply flawed. It overlooks the deliberate escalation that began on April 27, 2023, and disregards the active role of Kuki militants on May 3. Its narrative that the violence was orchestrated solely by Meitei groups with state complicity collapses when confronted with evidence, exposing instead a deliberate attempt to mislead public perception.

The reality is stark: Kuki militants had access to sophisticated weaponry well before May 3, with organisations openly endorsing militancy. What followed was a systematic targeting of Meitei civilians, homes, and sacred sites across both hills and valleys. The evidence points not to PUCL’s version of events, but to a larger conspiracy driven by Kuki militant groups seeking a “Kukiland” or Zalengam, inspired by notions of territorial expansion similar to Nazi Lebensraum, and abetted by vested interests opposed to state actions on drugs, forests, and immigration.

By reducing the crisis to a simplistic binary and vilifying one community, PUCL ignores the complex realities on the ground. Its selective lens betrays a prejudiced ideological position that risks fuelling division rather than aiding reconciliation. With the official report of the Justice Ajay Lamba Commission still awaited, one must ask: what credibility or value does such a lopsided inquiry truly hold? The report’s reliance on the discredited Editor’s Guild of India “fact-finding mission” itself the subject of multiple FIRs for promoting enmity further undermines its seriousness.

A flawed report of this nature not only damages PUCL’s credibility but also deepens mistrust among communities already scarred by violence.

For peace and justice to prevail in Manipur, fact-finding must rise above prejudice. It must be anchored in objectivity, inclusivity, and rigorous verification; anything less risks perpetuating the very divisions it claims to resolve. In a state torn by mistrust, truth must unite, not divide. Anything less than honest, balanced inquiry will only write the next chapter of conflict, not reconciliation. Manipur deserves truth, not manufactured narratives.