Bangladesh’s 2026 Election will decide India’s security for a generation

I was in Dhaka recently, invited to speak at the fourth edition of the annual geopolitical dialogue, the Bay of Bengal Conversation, where participants from more than 85 countries were there. 

While my plenary and studio sessions were confined to the impact of artificial intelligence and emerging technologies, I was privy to listen to many experts on the Bangladesh political scenario as the country warms up to the elections. 

In the 3 day dialogue beginning from 22 November last, Bangladesh’s Chief Justice Syed Refaat Ahmed and Foreign Adviser Md Touhid Hossain also spoke around Bangladesh’s directions to the future.

Bangladesh stands at a critical juncture as it prepares for general elections in February 2026, following the dramatic collapse of Sheikh Hasina's government during the July-August 2024 uprising. 

The elections will take place alongside a constitutional referendum on the July Charter, marking what could be the most consequential democratic exercise in the nation's history. For India, particularly its northeastern states, the outcome carries profound strategic implications that extend far beyond bilateral relations.

The "Monsoon Revolution" dismantled the decades-long duopoly between the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), fundamentally reshaping the country's political architecture. With the Awami League banned from participating following Sheikh Hasina's conviction for crimes against humanity, the electoral battlefield has been transformed.

The BNP emerges as a frontrunner, though opinion polls show roughly two-thirds of voters remain undecided, suggesting considerable electoral volatility. The student-led National Citizen Party (NCP) has positioned itself as a centrist, pluralist force calling for a 'Second Republic' and new constitution, though its organizational weaknesses and political inexperience may limit its immediate impact.

Perhaps most significantly, Jamaat-e-Islami, an Islamist party banned by Hasina's regime, is experiencing a resurgence. The party's student wing's recent electoral victories signal growing influence, raising concerns about Bangladesh's ideological trajectory. The potential formation of a BNP-Jamaat coalition, reminiscent of their 2001-2006 alliance, could fundamentally alter the country's domestic and foreign policy orientation.

Also Read: The new strategic triangle: How China-Pakistan-Bangladesh axis threatens India's Northeast

Interim leader Muhammad Yunus faces the formidable challenge of conducting credible elections amid warnings of both internal and external forces seeking to disrupt the process. Security agencies plan to deploy nearly 92,500 military personnel across the country, reflecting the gravity of security concerns.

Several scenarios could unfold. A clear BNP victory with reasonable turnout would likely ensure smooth power transfer, particularly with army backing. However, an unexpectedly strong Islamist showing could trigger military intervention, given the armed forces' concerns about radicalization and regional stability.

The referendum outcome adds another layer of complexity. Strong support for the July Charter could establish institutional checks and balances, promoting unity among anti-Hasina forces. Conversely, a "no" vote would free the winning party from reform commitments, potentially squandering opportunities for systemic change.

The specter of violence also cannot be ruled out. Sheikh Hasina has warned that excluding her party would deepen divisions, with millions of supporters potentially boycotting the vote. Combined with concerns about AI-generated misinformation potentially sparking post-election riots, Bangladesh faces significant stability risks.

For India, the stakes could hardly be higher. Under Sheikh Hasina, bilateral ties flourished in counter-insurgency coordination, infrastructure connectivity, energy cooperation, and border management. Her departure has already strained relations, although there are signs of many avenues receiving fillip once the new government is elected in office.

The major Bangladeshi parties competing are critical of India, reflecting anti-India sentiment among the public based on a perception that New Delhi only supported Hasina's regime. However there have been constant engagements with other political parties including the BNP and Jatiya party whose MPs have come to India on visits organized by the MEA. Also bilateral trade continues to maintain its stable numbers and many items from Bangladesh enjoy special concession in India.

Yunus's controversial characterization of India's Northeast as "landlocked" and Bangladesh as the region's "guardian of the ocean" led to India halting crucial transhipment facilities, disrupting Bangladesh's ready-made garment exports. Possibly these statements were not necessary as they don’t help either country.

More alarmingly, current Chinese investment in Bangladesh now exceeds $10 billion, spread across more than 30 major projects. Yunus's embrace of Chinese investment as a "game-changer" signals a strategic pivot that could fundamentally alter South Asia's power balance. The potential revival of the Lalmonirhat Airbase with Chinese involvement, situated merely 135 kilometers from the strategic Siliguri Corridor, has triggered acute security concerns in New Delhi.

India's northeastern states face particularly acute vulnerabilities. Bangladesh shares a 1,879-kilometer border with Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya, and Mizoram, making border security and cross-border cooperation paramount.

During Hasina's tenure, Bangladesh actively cooperated in counter-insurgency operations, including handing over leaders of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and dismantling militant camps. The 2013 Extradition Treaty and 2015 Land Border Agreement significantly curtailed northeastern insurgent groups' operational capabilities.

The post-Hasina environment presents worrying trends. Security analysts report concerns about potential revival of militant camps, increased infiltration risks, and growing Islamist influence that could provide cover for anti-India activities. Intelligence reports indicate ISI has begun training operations in border districts, potentially targeting India's internal security.

The Siliguri Corridor—often called India's "Chicken's Neck"—connecting mainland India to the Northeast, has become a focal point of strategic anxiety. With China encircling this vital passage through Nepal, Bangladesh, and Bhutan, any hostile turn in Dhaka significantly magnifies vulnerability.

Economic connectivity projects have stalled. The Ashuganj Inland Container Port development remains suspended, while services through the Khulna-Mongla Port rail link have yet to commence. Trade through northeastern land ports faces disruptions, threatening development initiatives that had begun transforming the region's economic prospects.

India must navigate this transition with strategic sophistication, balancing principled positions with pragmatic engagement. On the ground the mission and its officers have been doing a very good job and engaged with all key interlocutors from the Bangladesh side. Several approaches merit consideration.

First, it is crucial to maintain dialogue with all stakeholders. While supporting democratic processes and minority rights, India should continue to engage constructively with emerging political forces, including those less sympathetically disposed toward New Delhi. Second, border security has to be strengthened without escalation. Enhanced surveillance, intelligence-sharing mechanisms with cooperative elements in Bangladesh's security establishment, and infrastructure improvements along the frontier are essential. Third, economic interdependencies has to be preserved. Despite political turbulence, Bangladesh remains economically dependent on Indian cooperation for transit, power supply, and market access. India should use these linkages judiciously—not as coercive tools but as foundations for continued engagement that serve mutual interests. Fourth, the pace of northeastern development has to be accelerated. The best response to connectivity disruptions through Bangladesh is diversifying options. Expediting projects through Myanmar, developing the Sittwe Port's operational capacity, and investing in northeastern infrastructure reduces dependence on any single neighbor. Finally, strategic patience has to be demonstrated. Bangladesh's democratic transition will be messy and prolonged. India should position itself as a reliable partner committed to Bangladesh's stability and prosperity, willing to work with any democratically elected government that respects mutual security concerns.

The February 2026 elections will not merely determine Bangladesh's government—they will shape South Asia's strategic geometry for years to come. For India and its northeastern states, the challenge lies in protecting vital interests while respecting Bangladesh's sovereign democratic choices and engaging optimally. In an era of intensifying great-power competition, Bangladesh's trajectory matters profoundly, demanding from New Delhi both vigilance and vision. As I have observed on the ground, there are many positive signs and everyone is looking forward to the elections which should be announced very soon.