Is the Indo-Pacific Power Balance Shifting Against India Under Trump 2.0?

One important factor that contributed to the resetting of ties between India and the US in the 21st century is the rise of China. The US' sudden awakening to China’s quiet rise created the ground for easy convergence between the two countries.

The cautious engagement that was initiated in the post-Cold war era gradually evolved into a decisive strategic partnership. Historic Civil Nuclear deal was signed in 2008, which legitimized India’s status as a ‘nuclear-weapon’ state without having signed the NPT. The relationship further deepened to encompass areas, such as, defense, intelligence sharing and maritime security. Important strategic agreements like Logistics Exchange Memorandum Agreement (LEMOA), Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) were inked, that established India as a key strategic partner of the U.S. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) was formed and revived in 2017 with India as a core member. However, since the return of Donald Trump for the second time to the Presidency, India-US relations appeared to have lost the momentum.

There was a growing sense of mistrust in the relationship. Images of Indians being deported in Chains, targeted imposition of tariffs as high as 50 percent, multiple claims to humiliate Indian establishment on Indo-Pak ceasefire, current US President’s increasing tilt and reliance on Pakistan and disparaging remarks describing India as ‘dead economy’ or ‘hellhole’ collectively point to a pattern to pressurize India to come to terms with Trump’s transactional nature of diplomacy and compromise India’s own interests.

Under Trump, the US foreign policy seems to have been recalibrating in ways that is detrimental to India’s strategic interests. In fact, Trump’s persistent bullying and individualist approach may eventually push India towards exploring a better devil in China compared to the US. If so happens it will potentially dilute decades of ‘Indo-Pacific’ narrative and equation among countries that evolved under the aegis of the United States.

India, in fact, lacked a precise policy towards ‘Indo-Pacific’ until the visit of Japan’s PM Shinzo Abe to India in 2007. Abe’s speech in the Indian Parliament titled ‘Confluence of the Seas’ underlined most precisely the significance of ‘two seas’ and rang a bell of alarm to countries about China’s growing military build up and assertion in the region. It was a wakeup call that inspired concerned countries including the United States to come together to work upon a framework to formalise a common ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategy, with a primary focus on maintaining a rules based order in the region. Consequently, the Obama Administration announced its ‘pivot to

Asia’ strategy in 2012 following the visit of the then Secretary of States, Hillary Clinton to Asia in 2011. Her address in Chennai reflected the US's sincere outreach to portray India as a counterbalance to China. She said that “we are, in fact betting on India’s future. “Indo-Pacific” replaced “Asia-pacific” in America’s strategic thinking and emerged as a central concept under President Trump’s first tenure. The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) was renamed to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) in 2018. The National Security Strategy of US, declassified in 2021, reiterates US firm consensus on India’s ability to counterbalance China. Thus, under the last three U.S. administrations including Trump’s first term, India’s stature as a counterweight to China consolidated and India became an important lynchpin of America’s Indo-Pacific policy.

However, the return of Donald Trump to the White House in 2025 has significantly eroded the centrality of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ framework and the strategic significance of the QUAD. He, in fact, has turned the grouping leaderless and degraded its geostrategic value. Every member of QUAD has suddenly been left off guard to navigate their path independently. Under Trump the US appears inward-looking and avaricious for short-term gains.

Trump’s over confidence helps him believe that he can manage competition with China by leveraging US’ economic power and his personal ‘transactional diplomacy’. In such a scenario, India would have to carry the greater burden of balancing an assertive China. The uncertainty surrounding US’ reliability and the breach that President Trump orchestrated in Indo-US partnership has compelled India to rely more on exploring ways and means to balance the setback. There is growing mistrust that the US is not a reliable partner. India is, therefore, trying to adapt to a more fragmented international system by relying on more smaller and more flexible coalitions and increasing its diplomatic outreach across regions. India has also relaxed restrictions on Chinese investments by relaxing the 2020 regulatory framework. India realizes that it is high time to pursue its ‘multi-aligned’ foreign policy to transform the adversity to opportunity.