The new strategic triangle: How China-Pakistan-Bangladesh axis threatens India's Northeast

The June 19 trilateral meeting in Kunming between China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh marked more than just another diplomatic gathering—it formalized India's worst strategic nightmare. For the first time since independence, India faces a coordinated, institutionalized alliance among three of its most significant neighbors, creating a concern for many regions including the North East.

This isn't merely about diplomatic positioning. The establishment of a joint working group to enhance cooperation across trade, investment, defense, and maritime affairs represents the institutionalization of what was once an abstract threat. The timing couldn't be more ominous, coinciding with growing political instability in Bangladesh as pressure mounts on interim leader Muhammad Yunus for elections.

India's northeastern states, connected to the rest of the country through the precarious Siliguri Corridor—the infamous "chicken's neck"—have long been the country's Achilles' heel. But what was once a theoretical vulnerability has transformed into an active strategic challenge. When Muhammad Yunus provocatively declared during his March 2025 China visit that India's seven northeastern states could only access the ocean via Bangladesh, positioning his country as the "only guardian" of the Indian Ocean in the region, he wasn't just making inflammatory remarks—he was signaling a fundamental shift in strategic thinking. The reported Chinese invitation to build an airbase in Bangladesh's Lalmonirhat district, barely 20 kilometers from the Indian border, with Pakistani involvement as subcontractors, transforms this rhetoric into tangible threat. This development would position potential adversaries within striking distance of India's most vulnerable strategic corridor.

China's approach has evolved from gradual influence-building to active strategic positioning. With bilateral trade reaching $24 billion in 2024—$22.88 billion being Chinese exports—Beijing has cemented its position as Bangladesh's largest trading partner. More significantly, China's $2 billion loan rollover to Pakistan in March 2025, supporting Islamabad's recovery after a $7 billion IMF bailout, demonstrates Beijing's commitment to maintaining strategic partnerships even during economic stress.

The expansion of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to include Afghanistan, agreed upon in a May 2025 trilateral meeting in Beijing, creates a broader regional connectivity framework that could strategically isolate India. Beijing's announcement that the first foreign astronaut to visit China's Tiangong Space Station will be Pakistani, and that its 2028 Chang'e-8 moon mission will carry a Pakistani rover, reflects the deepening technological and strategic partnership between the two nations.

Perhaps most striking is the dramatic shift in Pakistan-Bangladesh relations. After decades of estrangement rooted in the 1971 liberation war, the two nations have embarked on unprecedented cooperation since August 2024. Bilateral trade increased by 27% between August and December 2024, with both countries targeting $3 billion in trade volume within a year.

The military dimension is particularly concerning. Bangladesh's participation in Pakistan's "Aman 2025" naval exercise after a decade-long gap signals renewed defense cooperation. Between September and December 2024, Bangladesh ordered 40,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, 2,000 rounds of tank ammunition, and 40 tonnes of RDX from Pakistan. Reports of Bangladesh's interest in purchasing Pakistani JF-17 jets and potential Abdali missile deals underscore the security implications of this rapprochement.

Sheikh Hasina's fall in August 2024 marked a watershed moment in regional dynamics. Under Muhammad Yunus's interim government, Bangladesh has systematically distanced itself from India while embracing closer ties with China and Pakistan. Yunus's decision to make China his first foreign destination—traditionally, South Asian leaders prioritize India—symbolized this strategic reorientation.

Bangladesh's invitation to Chinese state-owned entities to manage the Teesta River project, despite India's prior willingness to support it, exemplifies this shift. The domestic political changes have created space for anti-India sentiment to flourish, fundamentally altering regional equations.

The May 2025 India-Pakistan crisis following the Pahalgam terrorist attack that killed 26 civilians provided the first test of this new alignment. India's Operation Sindoor, targeting nine sites across Pakistani-administered Kashmir and Punjab, demonstrated the triangle's strategic implications. Bangladesh's response was revealing—Chief Adviser Yunus positioned himself as a neutral mediator, commending both Modi and Shehbaz Sharif for agreeing to a ceasefire rather than supporting India as a traditional ally would.

This neutrality represents a stark departure from Bangladesh's historical alignment with India during regional crises, signaling the effectiveness of the new strategic triangle in reshaping regional dynamics.

The emerging axis poses immediate and long-term challenges to India's northeastern strategy. The potential revival of the Lalmonirhat airbase with Chinese and Pakistani assistance would provide staging grounds for military activities near India's most vulnerable corridor. Given Pakistan's historical support for northeastern insurgencies between 1991-2004, renewed Pakistan-Bangladesh cooperation raises concerns about the revival of such activities.

India's response has been constrained by the emerging realities. Heightened security measures around the Siliguri Corridor and the revocation of key transshipment facilities for Bangladeshi exports demonstrate India's defensive posture. However, the recent crisis highlighted the limitations of India's strategic bandwidth when dealing with multiple fronts simultaneously.

The 2025 India-Pakistan near-conflict was the first involving a military equipped with modern Chinese weapons—the HQ-9 air defense system, PL-15 air-to-air missiles, and J-10 fighter aircraft. This integration of Chinese military technology into regional conflicts adds a new dimension to South Asian security dynamics.

The China-Pakistan-Bangladesh axis is no longer a potential threat but an active strategic challenge. Unlike previous episodic or bilateral threats, this convergence creates a sustained, multilateral framework for potential opposition to Indian interests. The developments of 2024 and 2025 demonstrate not merely diplomatic recalibration but a fundamental reordering of regional alliances.

India's traditional approach of bilateral engagement could be insufficient when confronting coordinated trilateral cooperation. The northeastern states, long considered the gateway to Southeast Asia, risk becoming a frontline in strategic competition unless India adapts quickly to these changing dynamics.

The triangle may not yet be fully militarized, but its potential for strategic complications has been demonstrated. The question is no longer whether this axis will challenge Indian interests, but how quickly and effectively India can respond to contain its implications for regional stability and strategic autonomy. The time for reactive diplomacy has passed—what's needed now is a comprehensive strategy matching the scope and sophistication of this unprecedented challenge.




 

(Subimal Bhattacharjee is Treasurer and Head of Critical and Emerging Technologies division of SHARE and a former country head of General Dynamics in India. He can be reached at subimal@subimal.in)