From "Non-Existent" to Negotiation Table: The Inconsistent Recognition of the Kuki-Zo Council

What was once dismissed as a phantom organization has now emerged as a key interlocutor in efforts to restore peace, highlighting the pragmatic necessities that drive governance in deeply fractured societies.

Both N Biren Singh and Y Khemchand Singh belong to the same Bharatiya Janata Party, raising the question. Why such divergent approaches to the KZC?

The Manipur government's dramatic reversal on the Kuki-Zo Council (KZC), from categorically declaring it a non-existent entity of dubious origins in a December 18, 2024, press release to formally inviting its chairman, Henlianthang Thanglet, and members for direct talks with Chief Minister Yumnam Khemchand Singh in Guwahati on March 21, 2026, exemplifies one of the most pronounced inconsistencies in the state's management of its protracted ethnic crisis.

This shift, occurring under new leadership after a period of Presidential rule, exposes how political realities, exhaustion from conflict, and external pressures can compel even staunch positions to evolve. 

The state government's denial in late 2024 arrived amid acute tensions. The press release from the Directorate of Information & Public Relations, issued under then-Chief Minister N. Biren Singh's administration, was unequivocal. 

"There is no organisation called Kuki-Zo Council; public are advised not to pay heed." It challenged the group's legitimacy, pointing to the absence of official records in Manipur, the non-existent "Lamka" district cited as its headquarters, and suspicions of external fabrication linked to concerns over influx from neighboring countries. 

The statement called for police probes, FIRs, media restraint, and public vigilance against groups allegedly intent on creating confusion and unrest. This stance dovetailed with N Biren Singh's hardline approach, which portrayed the ethnic violence that erupted on May 3, 2023, resulting in over 300 deaths, widespread arson, and the displacement of tens of thousands, as primarily a security challenge involving "illegal immigrants," drug cartels, and forest encroachments. 

By rejecting the KZC, the administration sought to undermine any unified hill representation that might bolster demands for autonomy, separate administration, or territorial reconfiguration, outcomes viewed as direct threats to Manipur's unitary integrity.

However, by February 2025, the political terrain had undergone seismic changes. Biren Singh resigned on February 9, 2025, facing intense internal BJP dissent, public protests, and threats of no-confidence motions that exposed the limits of his confrontational strategy. 

Then, President's Rule followed, placing the state under direct central control until February 4, 2026, when Yumnam Khemchand Singh, a BJP MLA from Singjamei, former Assembly Speaker, and close of RSS as more consensus-oriented, was sworn in as Chief Minister. 

The new government under Khemchand Singh inherited a state still gripped by the aftermath: economic paralysis from intermittent blockades, sporadic attack, segregated communities with little inter-mixing, persistent insecurity in border and hill areas, and tens of thousands lingering in relief camps. 

On March 17, 2026, the Chief Minister's Office dispatched letter No. 1/25/2026-CM, signed by Secretary Neilenthang Telien, inviting the KZC for discussions on "bringing back peace and normalcy" in Guwahati on March 21, a neutral venue requested by the council. 

The KZC accepted promptly, and today, March 21, 2026, the Chief Minister arrived in Guwahati for the meeting, marking the first direct state-level engagement with the council since the violence began. 

Reports indicate the talks involve leaders representing multiple tribes under the KZC banner, with focus on pathways to stability ahead of potential higher-level interventions, including a possible visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi later in the year.

The Guwahati meeting, in neutral Assam territory, allows symbolic progress without the appearance of concession in Imphal, aligning with central priorities for de-escalation and enabling the new administration to demonstrate tangible steps toward economic revival, rehabilitation, and investor confidence amid prolonged instability.

This "inconsistent recognition" arises from converging pressures. First, the pragmatic imperative for de-escalation is overwhelming. Nearly three years on, governance remains crippled on resettlement of IDPs completely. 

National Highways face vulnerability despite periodic reopenings, choking commerce and supplies. The KZC, emerging as a prominent civil society coalition around October 2024, has gained traction in coordinating aid, organizing rallies, demands for separate administration or Union Territory status, abstaining from government formation without safeguards, and interfacing with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in 2025. Dismissing it risked indefinite deadlock; engaging it opens doors for incremental wins, such as phased road access, camp relocations, or rehabilitation acceleration.

Nevertheless, the recognition is partial and fraught because the KZC's representativeness within the "Kuki-Zo fold" remains hotly contested. Not all tribes embrace the umbrella identity or the council's authority.

The Thadou community, Manipur's largest hill tribe (over 216,000 per 2011 Census), asserts independence through Thadou Inpi Manipur (TIM) and affiliates. The November 2024 Thadou Convention declared Thadou a "separate, independent entity," rejecting subsumption under "Kuki," condemning "Kuki supremacy," and limiting "Kuki-Zo" to "Any Kuki Tribes".

The Zomi Council too rejected "Kuki-Zo" nomenclature via a May 2024 resolution and deemed the KZC "not legitimate" and unwelcome in Zomi areas like Churachandpur. Several organizations view "Zomi"  as original, and see "Kuki-Zo" as a recent identity construct and uphold post-1997 accords against forced labeling, pursuing independent paths on autonomy demands.

The Hmar and Vaiphei groups resist exclusive framing, advocating inclusive terms like "Kuki-Zomi-Hmar." Hmar Inpui and Vaiphei Peoples’ Council engage tactically on political abstention, but prioritize distinct identities to prevent erasure.

These divisions, stemming from pre-colonial ethnonyms, historical peace accords, and apprehensions of dominance, mean the KZC primarily represents a Kuki-oriented segment with partial participation from others.

Dissenters criticize unauthorized activities in their territories and chart separate courses, potentially undermining any state-KZC accord's breadth.This inconsistency reflects adaptation, not capitulation. 

Therefore, the 2024 denial addressed acute misinformation threats and the 2026 engagement recognizes de facto influence amid fatigue. It preserves core red lines (territorial integrity versus autonomy) while opening channels, though favoring one faction risks further alienation.

For meaningful advancement, the Guwahati talks, underway today upon the CM Khemchand's  arrival, must transcend symbolism. Potential outcomes include commitments to highway security, militant camp relocations, expedited rehabilitation, justice mechanisms for victims, and frameworks for inclusive dialogue.

Let this initiative yield concrete results. Common people, across divides, have suffered enough with segregated lives, economic strangulation, and unresolved trauma demand healing steps, not prolonged division. 

If the Guwahati meeting fosters verifiable progress toward trust, resettlement, and normalcy, it could signal a genuine turning point; otherwise, it joins prior efforts as another fleeting hope!