Why Centre’s mediation tactics in the quarreling Meitei-Kuki resemble Yongna Tan Yenba

Why Centre’s mediation tactics in the quarreling Meitei-Kuki resemble Yongna Tan Yenba

Like the cunning monkey, the Centre positions itself as a neutral arbiter, offering to fairly divide resources, rights, or assurances between the Meitei and Kuki communities. However, its mediation often involves tactical concessions—temporary measures to placate one side before shifting focus to the other. For instance, promises of relocating the Kuki SoO camps far from Meitei areas may briefly calm tensions, but without addressing exact demands to abrogate the SoO, return of IDP to their homes, free movements within the state or the formation of a popular government, these efforts resemble the monkey’s deceptive bites.

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Why Centre’s mediation tactics in the quarreling Meitei-Kuki resemble Yongna Tan Yenba

In the Manipuri fable "Yongna Tan Yenba," a cunning monkey mediates a dispute between two cats over a cake, promising "equal justice" by dividing it fairly. Yet, the monkey repeatedly nibbles from the larger portion to "balance" the shares, ultimately consuming most of the cake, leaving the cats with little. This tale serves as a powerful metaphor for the Central government’s mediation in present Meitei-Kuki conflict. The "cake" of peace and equitable resolution shrinks as the Centre’s approach, under President’s Rule, prioritizes delicate balance over substantive progress. By addressing the conflict incrementally without tackling core issues, the Centre risks mirroring the monkey, perpetuating tensions and eroding trust between communities.

Like the cunning monkey, the Centre positions itself as a neutral arbiter, offering to fairly divide resources, rights, or assurances between the Meitei and Kuki communities. However, its mediation often involves tactical concessions—temporary measures to placate one side before shifting focus to the other. For instance, promises of relocating the Kuki SoO camps far from Meitei areas may briefly calm tensions, but without addressing exact demands to abrogate the SoO, return of IDP to their homes, free movements within the state or the formation of a popular government, these efforts resemble the monkey’s deceptive bites. This cycle of stopgap measures maintains a fragile status quo but undermines genuine reconciliation, leaving both communities feeling their concerns are sidelined.

The analogy highlights the Centre’s focus on short-term appeasement over lasting resolution. By avoiding decisive action that fully addresses either community’s demands, the Centre keeps both engaged in a drawn-out process, yet progress remains elusive. The Meitei and Kuki, like the cats in the fable, risk being left with diminishing returns—sustained conflict and fading hopes for peace—while the opportunity for meaningful dialogue slips away.

Recently, Union Home Minister Amit Shah has acknowledged that the prospect of forming a popular government in Manipur continues to be an elusive dream, hindered by deep-seated tensions between the Meitei and Kuki communities. Responding to queries about the restoration of an elected government, Amit Shah emphasized that achieving this goal remains a significant challenge until meaningful reconciliation and resolution of differences between these communities are realized. 

The political situation in Manipur, particularly following the imposition of President's Rule on February 13, 2025, has raised concerns about the integrity and consistency of the Central leadership. The sequence of events suggests a lack of sincerity in addressing the state's challenges. The imposition of President's Rule appears to align with the demands of certain Kuki MLAs and civil society organizations, yet the Central leaders apparent haste to establish a popular government raises questions about the necessity of imposition of President's Rule in the first place.

The Central leadership has publicly advocated for reconciliation among communities, yet recent incidents, such as the inability to bring the mortal remains of air hostess Lamnunthem Singson to her ancestral home in Old Lambulane, Imphal, highlight ongoing divisions. The Air Hostess, who temporarily resided in Kangpokpi due to the violence in Manipur in 2023, could not have her last rites performed in Imphal, her hometown, due to restrictions imposed by certain Kuki CSOs. Despite the authority of the President's Rule administration, the state government has seemingly yielded to these CSO demands, exposing its limited control over such matters.

The current administration should hold authority over these CSOs, but the reverse is evident. The state often seems held hostage, as seen in the abrupt shutdowns in Kuki-dominated areas following the death of a Kuki woman in crossfire between Central forces and Kuki militants. The Governor’s office should take decisive action independently, rather than being dictated by CSOs. While the rule of law is maintained in the valley, it is conspicuously absent in the hills. Such disparities, highlighted by recent events, risk emboldening anti-social elements to further divide the state.

While divisions are often attributed to communities, CSOs, and local leaders, the Central government's failure to effectively intervene and curb these divisions undermines its stated priority of reconciliation. If the Meitei and Kuki communities remain unreconciled over the next 15 months, there is growing apprehension that the general elections scheduled for 2027 could be deferred. This has led to increasing public skepticism regarding the Central government and BJP leadership's commitment to impartial governance, with accusations of double standards gaining traction.

On the misfortunate evening of February 8, 2025, Manipur descended into a profound political crisis, etching a somber chapter in its turbulent governance history. Former Chief Minister N. Biren Singh, under relentless pressure from dissenting Bharatiya Janata Party MLAs, submitted his resignation to Governor Ajay Kumar Bhalla, flanked by State BJP President A. Sharda Devi and cabinet colleagues. This was a voluntary exit, not a forced capitulation. Indeed it was orchestrated by a coalition of rebel legislators driven by personal ambitions and the allure of ministerial portfolios.

The failure of these MLAs to designate a successor before compelling Biren’s departure has plunged Manipur into a leadership vacuum, now stretching more than four months. The inability of Sharda Devi, senior MLAs, and BJP’s Northeast in-charge, Sambit Patra, to forge a consensus on a new leader has exacerbated the crisis, leaving the people of Manipur to grapple with the consequences of stalled governance, unresolved ethnic tensions, and the imposition of President’s Rule on February 13, 2025.

The leadership vacuum has persisted, with the BJP struggling to end its internal divisions and the Centre’s insistence on prioritizing ethnic reconciliation. The Monsoon Session of Parliament, set to run from July 21 to August 12, 2025, has raised hopes among some MLAs for the formation of a new government. However, recent events—such as the June 19 firing incident of a Meitei farmer in Phubala by Kuki militants, May 20 Gwaltabi incident on May 20 and the June 7 arrest of Arambai Tenggol member Asem Kanan by the CBI—have dampened optimism, particularly in the Imphal Valley. The BJP and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh leadership have been working behind the scenes for months to create a conducive environment for governance, but ongoing unrest has frustrated their efforts, particularly in the valley, though progress in the hill districts offers some hope.

With economic reforms on the Governor’s agenda, forming a popular government remains a distant prospect amidst ongoing instability. Four months after President’s Rule was imposed in Manipur, Governor Ajay Kumar Bhalla has requested Rs 1,000 crore from the Centre as a special assistance grant to address the economic fallout from over two years of violence, which has crippled revenue collection and economic activity. The funds aim to clear pension backlogs, cover security and relief costs for displaced persons, support Centrally sponsored schemes, and drive rural development, especially in hill areas. 

Ajay Bhalla also highlighted the state’s inability to access Rs 629 crore in 15th Finance Commission grants for local bodies since 2021-22, due to stalled elections for urban local bodies, Autonomous District Councils, and Panchayati Raj institutions. Additionally, he sought an early release of Rs 500 crore to meet urgent needs like pension and security expenses. Previously, the Centre provided Rs 500 crore in two instalments for revenue loss and recovery, fully utilized by the state. Last year, former CM N Biren Singh requested Rs 2,000 crore for similar economic challenges. 

Interestingly, the Opposition and rebel MLAs have falsely portrayed N. Biren Singh as the sole cause of Manipur's turmoil, a narrative that has gained traction among his critics. This oversimplification distorts the truth, ignoring the deep-rooted web of power struggles, ethnic divisions, and political opportunism that have long destabilized the state. In reality, these groups are the ones actively contributing to Manipur's chaos.

While former CM N Biren’s leadership style—often criticized as authoritarian—alienated key factions, the deeper roots of the crisis lie in the internal fissures within the BJP, which predate the ethnic violence that erupted on 3 May 2023. To understand Manipur’s current predicament, one must examine the interplay of ambition, ethnicity, and external pressures that have shaped its political chessboard.
The BJP’s resounding victory in the 2022 Manipur Legislative Assembly elections, securing 32 of 60 seats, initially positioned N. Biren Singh as a formidable leader. His first term (2017–2022) had been marked by efforts to address systemic issues like illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and deforestation—challenges he framed as existential threats to Manipur’s social and ecological fabric. These policies, while resonating with the Meitei community in the Imphal Valley, sowed seeds of discontent among the Kuki communities in the hill districts, who perceived them as discriminatory. By April 2023, internal discord within the BJP had already begun to surface, as Meitei MLAs, frustrated by their exclusion from key policymaking roles, started lobbying the central leadership in New Delhi for a change in leadership.

Prominent among the first dissenters were Heirok MLA Thokchom Radheshyam Singh and Karam Shyam, who resigned from their administrative posts, citing a lack of responsibility and influence. Paonam Brojen, another Meitei MLA, publicly criticized Biren for failing to fulfill assurances, accusing him of centralizing power. This rebellion was not merely a disagreement over governance but a calculated power struggle that weakened the BJP’s cohesion. By camping in Delhi and appealing to the party’s high command, these MLAs diverted attention from critical state issues, creating a leadership vacuum that emboldened opposition parties and tribal civil society groups to exploit Biren’s vulnerabilities. Their actions signaled to external actors that the Chief Minister’s position was precarious, laying the groundwork for the ethnic tensions that would erupt in May 2023.

The Manipur violence, which claimed over 300 lives and displaced thousands, exposed the fragility of Manipur’s social and political fabric. Biren’s policies, particularly his crackdowns on illegal activities in the hill districts, were perceived by the Kuki CSOs as targeting their interests, fueling accusations of bias. This perception galvanized a campaign to oust him, led by 10 Kuki MLAs, including seven from the BJP—Paolienlal Haokip, Nemcha Kipgen, Vungzagin Valte, and LM Khaute, among others—who openly declared their lack of faith in his leadership.

These Kuki MLAs, supported by opposition leaders like Dr. Lamtingthang Haokip and former BJP candidate Benjamin Mate, amplified their narrative through Kuki civil society organizations. They accused Biren of fostering division and marginalizing their community, a charge that resonated with Kuki populations reeling from the violence. Their hate campaign was further intensified by two controversial pieces of evidence: a July 2023 viral video depicting Kuki women being paraded naked in the Imphal Valley and leaked audio tapes, purportedly featuring Biren, which surfaced later and were scrutinized by the Supreme Court in February 2025. The swift dissemination of these materials by Kuki CSOs and national media outlets raised suspicions of a coordinated effort to discredit Biren. The timing and orchestration of these leaks suggest possible collusion with dissident Meitei MLAs, who were already frustrated with Biren’s leadership and may have seen an opportunity to weaken him further.

The involvement of Meitei MLAs in the campaign against Biren cannot be dismissed. MLAs like Radheshyam Singh, stripped of his cabinet portfolio in Biren’s second government, emerged as vocal critics, rallying others to demand a leadership change. Their grievances were rooted in Biren’s alleged authoritarianism and his tendency to sideline colleagues in favor of a close-knit circle of advisors. By April 2023, reports of Meitei MLAs camping in Delhi to lobby the BJP’s central leadership had become public, signaling a deepening rift within the party. The rapid circulation of the viral video and audio tapes raises questions about how these sensitive materials reached Kuki CSOs and the national media so quickly. The possibility of Meitei MLAs, frustrated by their marginalization, leaking or facilitating the spread of these materials to undermine Biren cannot be ruled out.

This internal rebellion within the BJP, driven by personal ambitions and ethnic alignments, significantly weakened the party’s ability to govern effectively. The dissenters’ actions not only destabilized Biren’s government but also emboldened external actors, including opposition parties, Kuki CSOs and the militant groups, to exploit the resulting chaos. The ethnic violence of May 2023, while rooted in longstanding grievances, was exacerbated by this political fracturing, as rebel MLAs prioritized their own agendas over state unity.

The tipping point came on February 8, 2025, when Biren convened a meeting with BJP-led alliance MLAs, aware of an impending no-confidence motion scheduled for February 10. Only 20 of the 46 National Democratic Alliance MLAs attended, a clear indication of the depth of dissent within the coalition. The next day, on February 9, N Biren resigned, accompanied by Sambit Patra and Sharda Devi. The rebel MLAs pushed for a say in selecting N Biren’s successor, but their efforts were stymied by the central BJP leadership’s inability to reach a consensus. This failure led to the imposition of President’s Rule, marking a low point in Manipur’s political history.

The rebellion within the BJP is multifaceted, led by figures like Thokchom Radheshyam Singh in the Imphal Valley and Paolienlal Haokip in the hill districts. Radheshyam, ousted from his cabinet portfolio in Biren’s second government, has emerged as a vocal critic, rallying Meitei MLAs to demand a leadership change. His campaign reflects a broader discontent among Meitei legislators, who feel sidelined by Biren’s centralized approach. In the hills, Paolienlal Haokip, a first-time MLA with ambitions of securing a Deputy Chief Minister or Home Minister post, has championed the Kuki cause, leveraging the demand for a separate administration to bolster his influence. His faction’s success in ousting Biren and securing President’s Rule marks a significant victory, positioning them to negotiate concessions from any new government.

Paolienlal Haokip’s push for a separate administration for Kuki community, has gained momentum since the 2023 violence. His faction’s strategic ambiguity—demanding autonomy while remaining open to supporting a new government that offers concessions— highlights the transactional nature of Manipur’s politics. However, this raises a critical question: if the Kuki MLAs are committed to a separate administration, what is their stake in Manipur’s legislative framework? Their participation in the current political drama seems paradoxical, yet it reflects a pragmatic approach to maximizing influence in a volatile environment. The central government, wary of setting a precedent for further balkanization, has been non-committal on the issue, leaving Haokip’s faction to hedge its bets.

Other MLAs, such as Bishnupur’s Konthoujam Govindas and Lamlai’s Kh. Ibomcha, once staunch Biren loyalists, have shifted allegiances, eyeing cabinet berths to bolster their prospects in the 2027 elections. Their opportunism, amplified by natural disasters like floods in Heingang and Khurai, has delayed government formation, as MLAs camp in Delhi to lobby the BJP’s national leadership. This scramble for power is not new to Manipur, where coalition politics and factionalism have long defined governance. However, the current crisis, compounded by the 2023 violence and President’s Rule, has amplified these dynamics, creating a volatile political chessboard where ambition often trumps unity.

Amid this turmoil, Speaker Thokchom Satyabrata Singh has emerged as a silent contender, yet stayed far away from the gossips, for the Chief Minister’s post. His neutral stance as Speaker positions him as a potential bridge between the Meitei and Kuki communities, though his ambitions remain discreet. Satyabrata’s ability to navigate ethnic divides and maintain a low profile makes him a viable candidate, particularly as the BJP seeks a leader who can unify its fractured ranks. However, his prospects depend on the central leadership’s willingness to prioritize reconciliation over political expediency.

The central government’s insistence on maintaining President’s Rule reflects a hard-nosed assessment of Manipur’s challenges. Locally, the state’s governance has long been a tinderbox, riven by ethnic tensions between the Meitei majority in the Imphal Valley and the Kuki and Naga tribes in the hill districts. These tensions are compounded by a decades-old insurgency fueled by over a dozen armed groups, whose activities have been exacerbated by instability in neighboring Myanmar. The influx of refugees and cross-border militancy has overwhelmed Manipur’s administrative capacity, necessitating centralized control from Delhi. Internationally, Manipur’s proximity to Myanmar, coupled with China’s Belt and Road initiatives and the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy, elevates its strategic importance. The Centre’s reluctance to lift President’s Rule stems from concerns that a fragmented local administration, prone to ethnic favoritism and political bickering, cannot address these multifaceted challenges.

The BJP’s numerical strength—44 MLAs, as claimed by Thokchom Radheshyam—gives it the upper hand to form a government without the 10 Kuki MLAs, who are focused on their demand for a separate administration. Home Secretaries’ efforts to involve CSOs in supporting a popular government are pragmatic but unlikely to succeed, as CSOs prioritize issues like internally displaced persons  and ethnic reconciliation over political maneuvering. Social media rumors of “brokerage” for leadership support lack credibility, given the BJP’s strong numbers and the Centre’s oversight.

Manipur’s dream of a popular government remains distant, tethered to the Centre’s reconciliation efforts and the BJP’s ability to overcome its internal divisions. The path to stable governance begins with courage, not convenience. Rebel MLAs must stay in the state and engage in dialogue to address the Centre’s mandate for peace now. Their prolonged absence from the state erodes their legitimacy and deepens the crisis. By championing reconciliation, rebuilding trust, and prioritizing the needs of their constituents, these leaders can pave the way for a government that reflects the will of Manipur’s people.

The Centre has assured the people of Manipur that peace talks are ongoing with both communities to resolve the conflict. While hopes for a swift resolution persist, the silence of those involved in the talks during fresh outbreaks of violence raises doubts about their sincerity. Furthermore, Central ministers visiting the state often meet communities separately, inadvertently widening the divide. 

Questions also linger as to why the Central leadership has not convened all elected BJP and NDA MLAs to forge a unified, amicable solution, which could bridge the rift and foster lasting peace. The sooner a stable government is in place, the better the chances of tackling Manipur’s deeper issues—insurgency, displacement, and ethnic mistrust. With less than two years until the 2027 elections, the window for action is narrowing.

Manipur, scarred by violence and betrayal, deserves a leadership committed to healing and unity. The political class faces a historic test: can it rise above factionalism and ambition to deliver stability? The people, weary from years of turmoil, are watching. By nibbling away at solutions without resolving core issues, the Central government risks mirroring the monkey, leaving Meitei and Kuki communities with mere crumbs of progress amid ongoing violence and unrest. History will judge those who fail to seize this moment. The time to act is now—Manipur cannot afford to wait.

Edited By: Nandita Borah
Published On: Jun 23, 2025
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