Lessons from Manipur: Why Karbi, Rengma and Dimasa Oppose the Kuki MoS in Assam

On March 15, 2026, the Government of Assam achieved what it described as a historic milestone in its peace process. In a ceremony at Dispur in Guwahati, attended by Education Minister Ranoj Pegu, the state signed two Memorandums of Settlement (MoS) with Kuki armed groups. 

However, the Karbi, Rengma, and Dimasa student unions, apex councils, and youth bodies, have issued coordinated statements condemning key clauses. 

They argue the MoS lacks genuine consultation, risks diluting constitutional protections under the Sixth Schedule, and could import the ethnic nightmare unfolding in neighboring Manipur. 

The MoS promise the creation of two dedicated bodies, namely, the Kuki Welfare and Development Council (KWDC) and the Hmar Welfare Development Council (HWDC), both headquartered in Guwahati. 

Structured with a chairman, deputy chairman, chief executive member, executive members, general members, and government nominees, these councils will receive state budgetary support to drive accelerated socio-economic, cultural, educational, and linguistic development in Kuki- and Hmar-dominated areas. 

Provisions also includes infrastructure projects, health and livelihood schemes, educational institutions, cultural preservation efforts, rehabilitation for former cadres and families of deceased militants, and ex-gratia payments. 

The Assam government frames this as a forward-looking step to address long-pending aspirations while fostering lasting stability in hill districts like Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao. 

However, this narrative of reconciliation has met fierce resistance from indigenous communities whose ancestral lands overlap with Kuki/Hmar-inhabited pockets. 

The opposition is not rooted in animosity toward Kukis or Hmars, they repeatedly affirm support for peace, development, and coexistence, but in a profound fear for their children's future: secure land tenure, cultural integrity, political autonomy, and intergenerational harmony.

Since erupting on May 3, 2023, the ethnic conflict in Manipur between Meitei and Kuki communities has claimed over 300 lives, displaced more than 70,000 people, and entrenched near-total segregation. Thousands remain in relief camps, communities live in fortified zones, and trust remains shattered amid accusations of land grabs, forest encroachments, new village formations, poppy cultivation, illegal migration from Myanmar, and selective evictions.

Similarly, certain Naga groups like the Tangkhul and Liangmai have reported escalating problems with Kukis, including incidents of assaults, house burnings, kidnappings, and armed confrontations in areas such as Waphong in Kangpokpi, Chassad in Kamjong, and Litan in Ukhrul, often tied to historical land disputes, village encroachments, and militant activities dating back decades but flaring up amid the broader instability. 

These intertribal frictions, rooted in competition over resources, territory, and influence, have created a volatile environment where alliances shift and minor incidents rapidly escalate.This alarming pattern of ethnic strife and fragmentation in Manipur raises serious concerns for neighboring indigenous groups in Assam, such as the Karbi, Rengma, and Dimasa, who inhabit adjacent border areas like Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao. 

Fears of spillover effects, through potential refugee movements, militant cross-border activities, disputed settlements, or similar land-rights tensions, have prompted opposition from these communities to any agreements or resettlements perceived as encroaching on their ancestral lands, highlighting the risk of similar instability spreading across state boundaries in the region.

For tribes of Assam, Manipur exemplifies how competing claims over land, resources, and identity can spiral into irreversible division. Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao, Sixth Schedule autonomous areas under the KAAC and DHDAC,host overlapping populations, with historical inter-tribal tensions like the 1990s–2000s clashes involving Kuki groups and Karbi outfits, and unresolved displacements from 2003–2004 violence. 

The proposed MoS's welfare councils, potentially operating in or near these districts with development schemes and rehabilitation, raise alarms of parallel authority bypassing autonomous councils. 

In their press release dated March 19, 2026, from the Central Committee headquarters in Haflong, the Dimasa Students' Union (DSU),  alongside other tribes of Dima Hasao, strongly condemned the agreement while carefully distinguishing their position. They acknowledge and respect the genuine aspirations behind creating welfare and development councils for Kuki and Hmar communities, recognizing that such mechanisms could potentially bridge governance and development gaps in Assam. 

However, they draw a firm red line at any provisions that encroach upon or undermine the existing constitutional framework in Dima Hasao. At the core of their opposition lies the perceived threat to the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, which grants special autonomy to tribal-majority hill districts like Dima Hasao through the Dima Hasao Autonomous Council (DHDAC). 

The DSU argues that Dima Hasao and Karbi Anglong already possess robust Autonomous District Councils under this Schedule, providing legislative, administrative, and financial powers tailored to protect indigenous tribal rights, land, resources, and self-governance. 

In this context, Clause 4.1 of the MoS related to the Hmar People's Convention-Democratic and Clause 2.1 related to the Kuki groups are seen as creating a "constitutional inconsistency."

The establishment of separate welfare and development councils, potentially operating in or parallel to Sixth Schedule areas, is viewed as impossible without diluting the authority and integrity of the DHDAC. Such parallel structures, they contend, could fragment administrative control, weaken the council's supremacy as the supreme constitutional authority in the district, and compromise the hard-won autonomy that safeguards Dimasa and other indigenous tribes from external interference in their homeland.

Compounding this concern is the specific demand in Clause 5.1 of the MoS with Kuki groups for the creation of four new MAC (Member of Autonomous Council) constituencies in Dima Hasao, particularly in Kuki-populated areas. 

The DSU deems this provision strongly opposed and wholly unacceptable to the people of Dima Hasao. They point out that the district already has existing allocations for Kuki representation within the autonomous council framework. 

Adding four more seats, they argue, would disrupt balanced governance, disproportionately favor one community at the expense of others (including Dimasa, who form a significant indigenous population), and risk further fragmenting political representation in a way that undermines equitable tribal interests. 

This move is perceived not as development-focused but as a forced imposition that could alter power dynamics and open doors to demographic or land-related shifts without adequate safeguards.

Besides, the Rengma Naga Peoples' Council (RNPC) explicitly opposes the specific clauses pertaining to the creation and reservation of two Member of Autonomous Council (MAC) constituencies for the Kuki community within areas it claims as Rengma ancestral land, as well as any allocation of land for the resettlement of families displaced during the ethnic violence of 2003–2004 that falls within those territories.

The RNPC asserts that the present Kuki-inhabited areas lie squarely within the erstwhile East Rengma Mouza and West Rengma Mouza, which form part of the historically recognized Rengma ancestral domain. 

Drawing on colonial-era records, including 19th-century British demarcations of the "Rengma Hills" (noted as early as 1841 in official gazettes and ethnographic accounts by figures like J.P. Mills and Alexander Mackenzie), the council affirms the Rengma Nagas' traditional occupation and indigenous status in the region. 

These boundaries, they argue, predate significant migrations and administrative reorganizations in Karbi Anglong (formerly Mikir Hills), where Rengmas claim to be among the original inhabitants before groups like the Karbis settled in adjacent areas. 

The RNPC emphasizes that the Rengma people are the "sons of the soil," with deep-rooted historical ties to the land, and that any political arrangement, restructuring, rehabilitation, or settlement on this territory without their explicit consent is fundamentally unacceptable.

The council maintains a clear distinction: it is not opposed to any community, including the Kukis, and explicitly wishes peace, development, and progress for them. However, it firmly rejects the use of Rengma ancestral land as a bargaining chip for political negotiation or appeasement.

It has urged both the Government of Assam and the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council (KAAC) to refrain from any decisions affecting Rengma ancestral domains without due engagement with the community. 

In a strong warning, the RNPC declares that any such unilateral move would be resisted through all available democratic and constitutional means, underscoring their determination to protect their heritage and future generations from perceived encroachments that could alter territorial integrity and spark renewed tensions reminiscent of past ethnic conflicts in the region.

In Karbi Anglong too, the Karbi Students' Union (KSU), particularly its Central Executive Committee (CEC), has emerged as a leading voice of opposition to  Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Government of Assam and Kuki armed groups (including UKDA, KRA, and KLO/KLA).

The KSU unequivocally condemned the provisions related to the reservation of two Member of Autonomous Council (MAC) seats specifically for the Kuki community in Karbi Anglong and the allocation of land for the resettlement of families displaced by the ethnic violence of 2003–2004.

The KSU makes it crystal clear that its position is not rooted in animosity toward any community, including the Kukis. It emphasizes that the Karbi people have a long-standing tradition of upholding peace, coexistence, and mutual respect with neighboring groups.

However, the union insists that this peaceful disposition must never be misinterpreted as weakness, passivity, or tacit approval of externally imposed decisions. The core grievance is the complete lack of proper consultation with the indigenous Karbi people of Karbi Anglong before finalizing these measures, which the KSU views as a direct disregard for their rights, collective sentiments, and hard-earned political autonomy under the Sixth Schedule framework of the Indian Constitution.

Such actions, they argue, not only undermine the authority of the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council (KAAC) but also risk reopening old wounds from the traumatic Karbi-Kuki ethnic clashes of 2003–2004. 
 
All these fears center on perceived Kuki "activities" in Manipur, illegal land encroachments, rapid settlements in forests, demographic pressures, that could replicate here via council-backed projects or influx facilitation. 

Without safeguards, they envision strained resources, altered demographics, mistrust from minor disputes, and escalation mirroring Manipur's cycle.

The November 2024's statement by KAAC CEM Tuliram Ronghang crystallized these insecurities. He declared no allowance for around 700–1,000 Kuki-Zo refugees from Manipur to settle in Karbi Anglong, citing "ignition for ethnic riot" risks based on past clashes; some were reportedly repatriated. 

However, Kuki groups dismissed it as misleading and inflammatory, noting minimal migration amid crisis. 

Today, Karbi, Rengma, and Dimasa leaders emphasize avoiding Meitei-Kuki-style confrontations. They seek peace through true consultation like, transparency, stakeholder inclusion, no parallel dilution of autonomy, and assurances against unregulated resettlement or demographic shifts.

The MoS advances rehabilitation and targeted development for Kuki/Hmar communities which is a positive step after years of ceasefire. But excluding hill tribes whose lands intersect too risks breeding resentment rather than unity. 

True peace in Assam requires learning the hard lessons from Manipur's scars. Assam's future generations, Karbi, Rengma, Dimasa, Kuki, Hmar, and beyond, deserve a shared future built on mutual consent, equitable development, and trust, not imposed pacts.