Manipur’s 35 Lakh People Held Hostage, How Long Will the Centre Tolerate This?

The recent extension of the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement, signed on September 4, 2025, between the Government of India, the Manipur state government, and Kuki insurgent groups under the Kuki National Organisation (KNO) and United People’s Front (UPF), was meant to be the first step towards peace for a state battered by ethnic strife. 

This tripartite pact aimed to strengthen ceasefire norms, restore peace, and ensure Manipur’s territorial integrity. 

Yet, within days, UPF spokesperson Aron Kipgen’s audacious demand for a “separate administration” for the Kuki-Zo community has shattered this fragile optimism. This blatant violation of the agreement’s core principles not only undermines the Centre’s efforts but also holds Manipur’s 35 lakh residents—across Meetei, Naga, Kuki, and other communities—hostage to the whims of armed groups who flout signed commitments. How long will the Centre indulge such duplicity, allowing militants to destabilise an already fractured state?

The Government of India must confront an uncomfortable truth: its current approach to dealing with Kuki militant groups in Manipur is not just flawed—it’s dangerously cyclical. Today, five armed groups are set to enter talks under the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement. Tomorrow, new shadow groups—often led by the same individuals already under SoO—will emerge, rebranded and ready to repeat the process. This is not peacebuilding. It’s a revolving door of insurgency dressed up as negotiation.

The pattern is predictable and deeply troubling. A group commits violence, gains visibility, and is invited to the table. Then, splinter factions form, often with the same leadership, and they too are legitimised through talks. What message does this send? That violence is a viable path to recognition. That the state will bend, again and again, to those who destabilise it.

People are beginning to ask hard questions. Is India prepared to keep bowing to demands from groups that multiply under the guise of ethnic representation? If this is the model, how long before PDFs fighting Myanmar’s Junta—many with cross-border ties—find their way to negotiation tables in New Delhi?

Also Read: Why Demanding Separation from Meiteis on the Kuki-Paite Clash 28th Anniversary Makes No Sense

This is not just a failure of strategy. It’s a failure of imagination. A peace process that rewards fragmentation and coercion cannot deliver lasting stability. The Centre must rethink its engagement model before it loses control of the narrative—and the region.

Initiated in 2008, the SoO is a ceasefire framework designed to bring insurgent groups into mainstream dialogue by halting violence and surrendering arms. The latest extension, effective from September 4, 2025, to September 3, 2026, introduced stricter rules to ensure compliance, as outlined in a Press Information Bureau (PIB) release. These include biometric identification via Aadhaar for all cadres, direct bank transfers for stipends to prevent misuse, and relocating camps from populated areas to reduce civilian disruption. Critically, the agreement mandates that KNO and UPF respect the Indian Constitution and Manipur’s territorial integrity while fostering peace through political dialogue. The PIB also highlighted the reopening of National Highway 2 (NH-2), a vital artery for the state, to end the crippling economic blockades that have plagued Manipur since the 2023 violence erupted.

This extension followed a turbulent period. In February 2024, the Manipur government withdrew from the SoO, citing repeated violations by Kuki groups, including alleged involvement in ethnic clashes and unauthorised armed activities. The Centre’s decision to renew the pact, despite these concerns, was framed as a “confidence-building measure,” with provisions like joint monitoring committees to enforce compliance. The reopening of NH-2 was a tangible step to alleviate the suffering of ordinary citizens, who have faced skyrocketing prices for essentials due to blockades. 

Yet, on September 7, 2025, Kipgen’s statement demanding a separate administration—reiterated in a joint KNO-UPF press release—directly contradicted the agreement’s terms. The groups accused the PIB of “misrepresenting” the pact by emphasising territorial integrity, claiming their talks focused on a Union Territory (UT) with a legislature for the Kuki-Zo people. This defiance not only violates the SoO’s ground rules but also mocks the Centre’s good-faith efforts.

The history of the SoO reveals a pattern of leniency and broken promises. Extended 14 times before 2025, the agreement has involved 25 Kuki-Zo outfits under KNO and UPF, who receive stipends and rehabilitation in exchange for peace. However, violations—ranging from retaining arms outside camps to alleged links with narcotics trade and ethnic violence—have been well-documented. The 2023-2025 clashes between Meeteis and Kukis claimed over 300 lives, displaced 70,000, and caused billions in economic losses. The Manipur government’s 2024 withdrawal was a response to these breaches, yet the Centre’s renewal, opposed by Meetei groups like the Coordinating Committee on Manipur Integrity (COCOMI), suggests political expediency over accountability. COCOMI’s scathing critique labelled KNO and UPF as “narco-terrorist groups” and the extension as “anti-people,” reflecting widespread frustration in the valley districts, where Meeteis face the brunt of blockades.

Manipur’s 35 lakh people bear the human cost of this ongoing crisis. Blockades on NH-2 and NH-37 have inflated food prices by 200-300%, disrupted healthcare, and halted education. Farmers cannot sell produce, businesses are collapsing, and relief camps house thousands in dire conditions. The SoO’s promise of free highway movement was a lifeline, but Aron Kipgen’s call for separation threatens to reignite blockades, perpetuating this hostage situation. The joint KNO-UPF statement further undermines trust by accusing the PIB of “spinning” the agreement, despite the clear stipulation against demands threatening Manipur’s unity. This discrepancy raises a critical question: If the groups reject the pact’s core terms, what is the point of dialogue?

This betrayal is a direct affront to the Ministry of Home Affairs and Union Home Minister Amit Shah, who has invested significant effort in resolving Manipur’s crisis through visits and high-level interventions. The Centre’s approach—extending the SoO despite violations—has emboldened militants, who now openly challenge the government’s authority. Aron Kipgen’s remarks, coupled with the groups’ claim that territorial integrity was not part of the signed document, are not just a breach of trust but a calculated provocation. As the original query asks, “Is it a joke?” No, it’s a tragedy for Manipur’s people, who deserve better than being pawns in this power play.

The Centre must reconsider its strategy. Appeasement has failed to yield peace; instead, it has emboldened groups to exploit the SoO as a shield for illicit activities, including alleged ties to Myanmar-based narco-networks. The revised rules—biometric verification and stipend oversight—are steps forward, but without enforcement, they are meaningless. Historical precedents, like the Mizo accords, show that firm action, not endless concessions, brings results. The Centre should enforce compliance, disarm non-compliant cadres, and integrate those willing to join the mainstream. If violations persist, abrogating the SoO is a necessary step to restore order.

Manipur’s path to peace requires decisive action, not empty promises. Empowering the state government to address grievances without fragmenting the state is crucial. The 35 lakh people—trapped in a cycle of violence, blockades, and despair—cannot wait for another broken agreement. The Centre must act now to end this hostage crisis and restore stability before Manipur descends further Dolores deeper into chaos.