Manipur’s fragile peace talks: Unchecked CSOs and armed groups hold the people hostage

The Committee on Tribal Unity (COTU), one of the Kuki-Zo civil society organisation (CSO), has proposed to declare May 3 as “Separation Day,” a provocative move that rejects reconciliation and deepens Manipur’s ethnic divide. This announcement, rooted in demands for a separate Kuki-Zo administration, highlights the chaos fueled by illegal CSOs and armed groups, many infiltrated by non-indigenous actors from Myanmar, even from the US and European Countries. By prioritizing division over dialogue, COTU’s agenda—backed by armed factions under the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement—silences the common Meitei, Kuki, and Zomi peoples who share Manipur’s history, struggles, and sacred connection to its land. This brazen act exemplifies a broader crisis: when outsiders outnumber and overpower indigenous communities, they dictate terms that betray the common people’s yearning for peace.

 

The government’s inaction compounds this chaos. President’s Rule has failed to restore law and order, leaving the Governor as a bystander. The state’s refusal to address Kuki protests barring Meiteis from Thangjing Hills for religious ceremonies exemplifies this inertia. The incident, where indigenous Meiteis were denied access to a sacred site, fueled perceptions of bias, with Kuki-Zo CSOs—potentially backed by non-indigenous elements—asserting control. Such capitulation empowers outsider-driven agendas, undermining the indigenous communities’ shared reverence for Manipur’s cultural landmarks.

 

Manipur, once a vibrant mosaic of ethnic coexistence, is now a battleground of fractured voices, its socio-political fabric torn apart by the unchecked proliferation of CSOs and armed groups. With an estimated 100-150 CSOs—50-60 in the Meitei-dominated Imphal Valley alone—and dozens of armed factions, including the Kuki National Army (KNA) and Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA), the state is held hostage by entities prioritizing power over unity. Organizations like the Indigenous Tribal Leaders’ Forum (ITLF) and COTU exploit ethnic grievances to paralyze governance, while illegal immigration from Myanmar empowers non-indigenous actors to dominate the narrative. The unsuccessful attempt of recent Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)-brokered peace talks and incidents like the Koubru and Thangjing Hills blockade reveal a stark truth: when outsiders seize control, they drown out the indigenous voices who breathe the air of Manipur’s lands. Only by listening to the common people can the state reclaim its soul.

 

The influx of illegal immigrants from Myanmar, particularly since the 2021 coup, has tilted Manipur’s balance, empowering non-indigenous actors to dominate its social and political fabric. Over 10,000 Myanmar nationals, primarily Kuki-Chin-Zo, have entered the state, with more than 5,400 detected in Kamjong district alone. This demographic shift—evident in Tengnoupal’s village count rising from 68 in 1969 to 326 in 2023 and from 179 villages in Kangpokpi to 721 in 2023 —has enabled armed groups and CSOs to assert control over hill areas. Leaders with ties to cross-border networks are accused of facilitating illegal settlements, poppy cultivation, and drug trafficking, further destabilizing the region. These outsiders, embedded within Kuki-Zo armed groups and CSOs like COTU and ITLF, amplify separatist demands, exploiting Manipur’s ethnic fault lines to advance agendas that diverge from indigenous priorities.

 

When illegal immigrants and their representatives outnumber or overpower indigenous groups, they can easily steer issues to suit their goals, sidelining the Meitei, Kuki, and Zomi peoples who have shared Manipur’s history for centuries. The indigenous communities, bound by their struggles against divisive law, their reverence for sacred sites like the Koubru and Thangjing Hills, and their connection to the state’s fertile lands, are increasingly marginalized. The magnification of issues like separate administration or ethnic violence suggests that outsiders, seeping into Manipur’s social fabric, are driving the narrative through outlawed CSOs. These groups, backed by non-indigenous muscle, present themselves as champions of local causes but often serve external interests—political, economic, or geopolitical—betraying the shared aspirations of Manipur’s original inhabitants.

 

In the Imphal Valley, the explosion of Meitei CSOs has created a chaotic scene where there are no sign of unity among the leaders. Groups like Coordinating Committee Manipur (COCOMI), United Committee Manipur (UCM), All Manipur United Clubs’ Organisation (AMUCO) and the Federation of Civil Society Organisations (FOCS) claim to champion “pan-Manipur” interests, yet their agendas could not include the hill tribes and Manipur as one entity. This splintering, akin to the Holi Nakatheng tradition where groups multiply for personal gain, is often driven by leaders seeking influence rather than unity.

 

With 50 odd CSOs in the valley alone, their competing demands—ranging from territorial integrity to opposition against hill tribe autonomy, from Border fencing to Schedule Tribes for Meitei/Meetei—one often wonders when will they unite and work together. This lack of unity among Meitei CSOs weakens their ability to represent indigenous Meitei interests. Ideological clashes and leadership rivalries prevent a cohesive front, as seen in their failure to rally behind recent MHA peace talks.

 

In the Kuki-Zo-Hmar hills, CSOs like ITLF operate with similar disregard for indigenous unity. Backed by armed groups, they push maximalist demands that inflame ethnic rivalries. The 2023 Tribal Solidarity March, supported by COTU and ITLF, was meant to oppose Meitei Scheduled Tribe status but spiraled into violence, killing over 260 and displacing 70,000. Such actions reveal how these CSOs, often influenced by non-indigenous leaders with ties to Myanmar, exploit grievances to advance separatist agendas, sidelining the indigenous Kuki and Zomi peoples who share Manipur’s cultural legacy. The sheer number of CSOs—100-150 statewide—ensures that governance is dictated by those with the loudest megaphones, not the deepest roots.

 

The governance crisis is exacerbated by armed groups, particularly the 25 Kuki-Zo factions under the 2008 SoO pact, including the KNO, ZRA, and Hmar outfits. Unlike traditional insurgencies, these groups rarely engage the state militarily. Instead, they leverage their arsenals to coerce negotiations, demanding autonomy or territorial councils. This strategy fuels ethnic clashes, as seen in the 2023 violence when SoO groups allegedly armed “village defense volunteers” to fortify tribal defenses against Meiteis. In August 2023, KNO and United Peoples’ Front (UPF) leaders pressed the MHA for a separate Kuki-Zo administration, a demand reiterated in January 2025. KNO’s Seilen Haokip, while hinting at flexibility, maintained pressure through armed readiness, illustrating a tactic: amass arms, restrain against the state, and negotiate from strength.

 

The SoO pact’s uncertain status—unextended since February 2024 after Manipur’s assembly sought to scrap it—adds volatility. Groups like KNA and ZRA could shift to insurgency if talks collapse. This threat holds the state hostage, as the government hesitates to act for fear of escalation. Meitei accusations that SoO groups arm tribal militias highlight a deeper issue: these factions, often led by non-indigenous figures, exacerbate communal violence, undermining the indigenous Kuki-Zo communities they claim to represent. Their presence in peace talks, backed by weapons, prioritizes their agendas over indigenous aspirations.

 

A recent closed-door meeting, convened by the MHA, exposed Manipur’s dysfunction where few Meitei and Kuki-Zo CSO representatives gathered to negotiate a six-point peace proposal, but the talks collapsed when one or two Kuki-Zo leaders rejected key terms. Another round is slated, but prospects are grim. The proliferation of CSOs, many infiltrated by non-indigenous actors, ensures no single group represents its community. Armed groups like KNO and ZRA loom over negotiations, their weapons a silent threat, amplifying their demands over indigenous voices. The failure of Meitei CSOs to unite mirrors the Kuki-Zo camp’s divisions, exacerbated by COTU’s divisive “Separation Day.”

 

The common people—indigenous Meitei, Kuki, and Zomi—bear the brunt of this crisis. In the valley, Meitei families fear to return back to their homes, while in the hills, Kuki and Zomi villagers face pressure to align with separatist agendas. The 2023 violence displaced thousands, destroyed livelihoods, and left communities scarred. Social media, often fueled by non-indigenous actors, keeps ethnic hatred alive, ensuring the war rages on. The economic toll is staggering: markets in Imphal and Churachandpur suffer shutdowns; farmers in manmade buffer zones struggle to access fields, and students face disrupted education. The psychological impact is profound, as indigenous communities live in fear, their shared history of coexistence eroded by outsider-driven divisions.

 

Ask the common people what they want, and their honest reply is clear: peace, security, and a return to Manipur where communities celebrated festivals together and respected each other’s traditions. A Meitei carpenter in Imphal or a Kuki shopkeeper in Churachandpur yearns for stability, not separation. Their voices, rooted in Manipur’s shared struggles, must guide the path to peace.

 

Manipur’s salvation lies in prioritizing indigenous will. First, regulate CSOs, mandating registration and inclusivity to curb divisive agendas. Outfits like COTU and ITLF, influenced by non-indigenous actors, must be sidelined. Second, resolve the SoO pact by disarming groups like KNO and ZRA or integrating them into security frameworks. Third, fence the India-Myanmar border and suspend the Free Movement Regime, with a transparent National Register of Citizens to address illegal settlers. Fourth, foster unified dialogue by listening to common people through community halls and relief camp surveys, empowering moderate voices and inter-ethnic peace committees. Finally, the Central government must lead with a task force to ensure inclusive, transparent peace talks, countering social media propaganda with unity campaigns.

The 2023 violence warns of a tinderbox future. By regulating CSOs, disarming groups, securing borders, addressing root causes, and listening to the common people, Manipur can reclaim its soul. The indigenous Meitei, Kuki, and Zomi deserve a future where their legacy triumphs over chaos sown by outsiders.